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ABSTRACT	  
In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  develop	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  systematic	  investigation	  of	  the	  political	  determinants	  of	  widespread	  protest	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  global	  food	  price	  crisis.	  Broadly	  engaging	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2001,	  2006)	  theory	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization	  engendered	  by	  transitory	  economic	  crises,	  I	  consider	  the	  role	  that	  both	  individual	  and	  structural	  factors	  play	  in	  promoting	  collective	  action	  for	  political	  change	  during	  such	  events.	  Fifteen	  hypotheses	  are	  offered	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  theory	  on	  food	  riots,	  political	  culture,	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  Ultimately,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  proposal	  for	  future	  research	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  changing	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  in	  facilitating	  widespread	  social	  unrest	  during	  transitory	  economic	  shocks.	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BACKGROUND:	  ECONOMIC	  CRISES	  AND	  POLITICAL	  CHANGE	   	  
	   Recent	  studies	  suggest	  that	  transitory	  economic	  shocks	  can	  impact	  political	  institutions	  and	  prospects	  for	  democracy,	  particularly	  in	  developing	  countries.	  For	  instance,	  Bruckner	  and	  Ciccone	  (2008)	  find	  that	  rainfall	  shocks	  in	  Sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa	  lead	  to	  significant	  democratic	  change	  in	  political	  institutions	  within	  the	  region.	  Particularly,	  they	  claim	  that	  substantial	  effects	  include	  a	  “tightening	  of	  executive	  constraints,	  greater	  political	  competition,	  and	  a	  more	  open	  and	  competitive	  executive	  recruitment”	  (2008:	  16).	  Additionally,	  Arezki	  and	  Bruckner	  (2011)	  demonstrate	  a	  significant	  effect	  of	  food	  price	  shocks	  on	  political	  change,	  albeit	  in	  a	  deleterious	  direction.	  Specifically,	  they	  find	  that	  spikes	  in	  international	  food	  prices	  increase	  the	  occurrence	  of	  civil	  strife	  and	  put	  at	  stake	  the	  political	  stability	  of	  the	  world’s	  poorest	  countries	  (2011:	  12).	  Perhaps	  more	  significantly,	  they	  show	  that	  food	  price	  shocks	  increase	  the	  risk	  of	  intra-­‐state	  conflicts	  and	  civil	  war	  (2011:	  4).	  	  
	   Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  (2001,	  2006)	  have	  sought	  to	  formally	  theorize	  on	  the	  conditions	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  political	  transitions	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  transitory	  economic	  shocks.	  Namely,	  they	  point	  to	  a	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  created	  during	  such	  crises	  in	  which	  the	  cost	  for	  citizens	  to	  contest	  power	  is	  low	  and	  potential	  returns	  to	  public	  mobilization	  high.	  As	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  offer,	  “The	  incentives	  to	  engage	  in	  or	  avoid	  fiscal	  redistribution…are	  a	  key	  factor”	  in	  creating	  the	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization,	  and	  thus	  in	  shaping	  the	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occurrence	  of	  political	  transitions	  during	  economic	  crises	  (2001:	  939).	  During	  such	  events,	  the	  public	  is	  incentivized	  to	  mobilize	  to	  demand	  economic	  concessions	  because	  the	  cost	  of	  mobilization	  may	  be	  lower	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  bearing	  the	  burden	  of	  an	  unfavorable	  fiscal	  adjustment	  (Drazen	  and	  Gilli	  1993).	  	  Further,	  the	  cost	  to	  authorities	  to	  offer	  economic	  concessions	  to	  mobilized	  groups	  during	  economic	  crises	  may	  be	  lower	  than	  the	  cost	  of	  an	  economically	  paralyzed	  public,	  stagnated	  economy,	  or	  than	  the	  resources	  required	  for	  quelling	  social	  unrest.	  Thus,	  economic	  crises	  can	  impact	  political	  change.	  	  
	   Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  theory	  is	  underscored	  by	  a	  wealth	  of	  literature	  that	  demonstrates	  that	  economic	  crises	  have	  often	  precipitated	  wide-­‐scale	  mobilizations	  and	  major	  political	  transformations,	  such	  as	  in	  the	  French	  Revolution	  (see	  Markoff	  1996;	  Sewell	  2011;	  Bouton	  1993).	  Other	  scholars	  show	  that	  numerous	  democratic	  transitions	  in	  Latin	  America,	  for	  example,	  occurred	  during	  economic	  crises	  (see	  Haggard	  and	  Kaufman	  1995).	  Additionally,	  a	  number	  of	  economic	  studies	  show	  that,	  in	  particular,	  economic	  shocks	  are	  a	  common	  precursor	  for	  mobilization.	  For	  instance,	  Hidalgo	  et	  al	  (2010)	  emphasize	  the	  mobilizing	  effect	  caused	  by	  adverse	  rainfall	  conditions	  that	  engender	  land	  invasions	  in	  Brazil.	  Dube	  and	  Vargas	  (2006)	  show	  that	  in	  Colombia	  sharp	  declines	  in	  coffee	  prices	  increase	  workers’	  propensity	  to	  join	  armed	  groups	  (cited	  in	  Hidalgo	  et	  al	  2010).	  Furthermore,	  Angrist	  and	  Kugler	  (2008)	  find	  that	  in	  the	  same	  country	  increases	  in	  the	  price	  of	  coca	  draw	  more	  people	  to	  the	  illegal	  drug	  trade	  (cited	  in	  Hidalgo	  et	  al	  2010).	  These	  studies	  corroborate	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  proposition	  by	  underscoring	  the	  idea	  that	  economic	  factors	  impact	  the	  opportunity	  cost	  for	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mobilization,	  such	  that	  relative	  costs	  are	  low	  and	  potential	  returns	  to	  collective	  action	  high	  during	  economic	  crises.	  	   	  
	   Outside	  of	  the	  economic	  literature,	  social	  movement	  theory	  has	  long	  noted	  the	  impact	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  institutions	  has	  on	  facilitating	  contentious	  politics.	  In	  his	  seminal	  work	  on	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement,	  for	  example,	  McAdam	  (1982)	  demonstrates	  that	  movement	  participants	  capitalized	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  US	  political	  economy	  to	  forge	  their	  campaign.	  These	  changes,	  he	  offers,	  facilitated	  the	  emergence	  of	  “political	  opportunity	  structures”	  such	  that	  movement	  participants	  felt	  that	  the	  threat	  of	  repression	  of	  mobilization	  was	  low,	  and	  potential	  returns	  to	  their	  demands	  for	  racial	  justice	  high.	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  history	  has	  shown	  that	  it	  is	  often	  the	  result	  of	  harvest-­‐induced	  crises	  that	  facilitate	  the	  emergence	  of	  collective	  opportunities	  for	  political	  change.	  No	  event	  other	  than	  the	  French	  Revolution	  points	  to	  this	  reality	  more	  clearly,	  as	  Markoff	  (1996)	  and	  Bouton	  (1993)	  demonstrate	  that	  insurrectionary	  actions	  resulting	  from	  food	  price	  increases	  ultimately	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  a	  democratic	  revolution	  in	  eighteenth	  century	  France.	  This	  reality	  is	  not	  lost	  in	  the	  contemporary	  era,	  moreover,	  as	  in	  their	  examination	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  international	  food	  price	  indices	  between	  1970	  and	  2007,	  Arezki	  and	  Bruckner	  (2011)	  find	  that	  for	  low	  income	  countries1	  dramatic	  food	  price	  increases	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  increase	  in	  the	  incidence	  of	  anti-­‐government	  demonstrations,	  riots,	  and	  civil	  conflict,	  and	  to	  a	  significant	  deterioration	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  (2011:	  1).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  World	  Bank	  identifies	  low	  income	  countries	  as	  those	  countries	  with	  a	  mean	  per	  capita	  GDP	  of	  $1999	  or	  less	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   The	  spike	  in	  international	  food	  prices	  during	  2007-­‐	  08	  and	  the	  ensuing	  social	  unrest	  that	  occurred	  worldwide	  in	  its	  wake	  underscores	  the	  immediate	  relevancy	  of	  economic	  crises	  and	  political	  change.	  As	  average	  prices	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  basic	  staples	  –	  rice,	  wheat,	  maize	  and	  soybeans	  –	  doubled	  during	  2007-­‐08,	  food	  riots	  broke	  out	  in	  over	  twenty	  countries,	  many	  of	  which	  had	  violent	  and	  enduring	  consequences.	  For	  instance,	  riots	  lead	  to	  the	  death	  of	  almost	  100	  people	  in	  Cameroon,	  a	  general	  labor	  strike	  in	  Burkina	  Faso,	  and	  to	  the	  toppling	  of	  the	  government	  in	  Haiti	  (Berazneva	  and	  Lee	  2011).	  Thus,	  transitory	  economic	  crises,	  and	  particularly	  those	  caused	  by	  food	  price	  shocks,	  are	  salient	  for	  processes	  of	  political	  change	  even	  today.	  
	   Yet,	  dramatic	  increases	  in	  food	  prices	  do	  not	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  social	  unrest	  and	  prospects	  for	  political	  change	  in	  countries	  the	  world	  over.	  As	  Fraser	  and	  Rimas	  remind	  us,	  “There	  are	  many	  more	  examples	  of	  people	  accepting	  volatile	  prices	  than	  rioting	  over	  them”	  (2011).	  Given	  this	  notion,	  we	  are	  led	  to	  question	  what	  factors	  actually	  motivate	  citizens	  to	  act	  during	  the	  political	  window	  of	  opportunity	  engendered	  by	  economic,	  and	  particularly,	  food	  price	  crises.	  Again,	  Fraser	  and	  Rimas	  advance	  our	  inquiry	  when	  they	  claim	  that	  often	  in	  explaining	  food	  riots,	  “A	  key	  psychological	  element	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  that	  arises	  between	  seeing	  food	  prices	  rise	  and	  pouring	  a	  Molotov	  cocktail	  -­‐-­‐	  is	  missing”	  (2011).	  	  
	   Indeed,	  as	  the	  following	  pages	  will	  show,	  studies	  of	  past	  food	  riots	  reveal	  that	  a	  sense	  of	  injustice	  is	  key	  in	  motivating	  citizens	  to	  action	  during	  food	  price	  crises.	  But,	  for	  who	  does	  this	  sense	  of	  injustice	  lie?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  forms	  the	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heart	  of	  this	  thesis.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  essay	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  framework	  for	  analysis	  of	  the	  political	  factors	  that	  lead	  citizens	  to	  mobilize	  during	  economic,	  and	  particularly	  food	  price	  induced,	  crises.	  While	  this	  thesis	  broadly	  engages	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2006)	  theory	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization	  created	  by	  economic	  shocks,	  it	  uniquely	  does	  so	  via	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  systematic	  investigation	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  changing	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  that	  impact	  the	  likelihood	  of	  occurrence	  of	  contentious	  public	  politics	  during	  such	  crises.	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THE	  PROPOSAL	  
	   Establishing	  a	  starting	  point	  for	  the	  study	  of	  democratic	  change	  from	  any	  angle	  is	  not	  an	  easy	  task,	  as	  there	  exists	  a	  number	  of	  conflicting	  ideas	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  democracy.	  Difficulty	  arises	  not	  only	  from	  an	  analyst’s	  perspective	  in	  spelling	  out	  indicators	  for	  its	  identification	  and	  measurement,	  but	  also	  from	  an	  actor’s	  standpoint	  in	  laying	  out	  parameters	  for	  its	  promotion	  and	  contestation	  (see	  Markoff	  2011).	  While	  a	  discussion	  of	  these	  issues	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  important	  to	  establish	  a	  reference	  for	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  concept	  of	  democracy	  will	  be	  engaged	  in	  the	  following	  pages.	  Therefore,	  because	  this	  study	  seeks	  to	  broadly	  engage	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis,	  it	  seems	  that	  employing	  the	  authors’	  basic	  idea	  of	  democracy	  provides	  a	  useful	  point	  of	  reference:	  
	   Democracy	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  situation	  of	  political	  equality	  and	  characterized	  	   by	  its	  relatively	  more	  pro-­‐majority	  policies.	  Often	  pro-­‐majority	  policies	  	   coincide	  with	  pro-­‐poor	  policies,	  especially	  a	  greater	  tendency	  to	  redistribute	  	   income	  away	  from	  the	  rich	  toward	  the	  poor.	  In	  contrast,	  nondemocracy	  	   gives	  a	  greater	  say	  to	  an	  elite	  and	  generally	  opts	  for	  policies	  that	  are	  less	  	   majoritarian	  than	  in	  a	  democracy.	  (2006:	  19)	  
	   Given	  this	  idea	  of	  democracy,	  the	  political	  window	  of	  opportunity	  facilitated	  by	  economic	  crises	  is	  understood	  as	  one	  engendered	  by	  a	  distributional	  conflict	  of	  interest	  between	  the	  more	  asset	  wealthy	  elite	  and	  more	  asset	  poor	  majority.	  During	  economic	  crises,	  a	  war	  of	  attrition	  arises	  between	  these	  groups,	  such	  that	  each	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evaluates	  the	  costs	  of	  bearing	  the	  burden	  of	  redistribution	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  restabilization	  of	  the	  economy	  (Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  1991).	  Social	  unrest	  occurs	  when	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  majority	  concludes	  that	  the	  costs	  to	  conceding	  to	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  distribution	  is	  greater	  than	  mobilizing	  to	  demand	  a	  resolution	  that	  is	  more	  in	  line	  with	  their	  interests.	  Further,	  while	  citizens	  mobilize	  on	  such	  occasions	  to	  demand	  immediate	  economic	  concessions,	  they	  also	  often	  call	  for	  broader	  democratic	  reforms	  to	  advance	  their	  general	  interests	  and	  to	  ensure	  the	  endurance	  of	  policy	  changes	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2001).	  Further,	  in	  yet	  more	  repressive	  contexts,	  citizens	  may	  also	  be	  confronted	  with	  the	  reality	  that	  they	  need	  to	  advocate	  for	  even	  the	  right	  to	  make	  claims,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  economic	  concessions	  they	  seek	  (Economy	  2004).	  Thus,	  economic	  crises	  can	  have	  implications	  for	  democracy	  and	  broad	  political	  change.	  
	   This	  explanation	  leads	  to	  yet	  another	  question	  –	  do	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  groups	  that	  mobilize	  during	  crises	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  majority?	  This	  is	  a	  question	  that	  also	  informs	  this	  thesis.	  More	  specifically,	  what	  do	  contentious	  politics	  that	  occur	  during	  economic	  crises	  tell	  us	  about	  more	  general	  citizen	  orientations	  toward	  and	  aspirations	  for	  democracy	  and	  political	  change?	  If	  we	  follow	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2001)	  theory	  that	  during	  economic	  crises,	  social	  pressure	  matters	  for	  political	  transitions,	  then	  indeed	  citizen	  views	  and	  their	  propensity	  for	  action	  on	  a	  broad	  scale	  during	  such	  events	  matter,	  too.	  	  
	   Few	  studies,	  however,	  systematically	  investigate	  citizen	  political	  orientations	  and	  propensity	  for	  action	  during	  economic	  crises.	  One	  probable	  reason	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for	  this	  case	  is	  the	  challenge	  of	  finding	  appropriate	  data	  for	  such	  inquiries.	  Access	  to	  data	  that	  measures	  citizen	  views	  and	  propensity	  for	  action	  during	  such	  events	  is	  a	  rare	  occasion.	  Yet,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  rare	  position	  to	  have	  that	  opportunity.	  Perhaps	  more	  significantly,	  we	  are	  in	  a	  rare	  position	  to	  conduct	  an	  analysis	  of	  a	  comparative	  nature	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  propensity	  for	  action	  in	  countries	  where	  social	  unrest	  occurred	  during	  an	  economic	  crisis.	  This	  rare	  opportunity	  is	  afforded	  by	  the	  collection	  of	  data	  in	  Central	  America	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  riots	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  region	  during	  the	  2008	  global	  food	  price	  crisis.	  
	   	  The	  data	  collected	  in	  this	  region	  was	  part	  of	  the	  2008	  wave	  of	  Latin	  American	  Public	  Opinion	  Project	  (LAPOP)	  surveys.	  These	  surveys,	  also	  called	  the	  AmericasBarometer,	  are	  geared	  to	  gather	  data	  on	  various	  aspects	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  behaviors	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean.	  The	  surveys,	  supported	  in	  part	  by	  leading	  international	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  US	  Agency	  for	  International	  Development,	  the	  Inter-­‐American	  Development	  Bank,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  Development	  Program,	  are	  conducted	  bi-­‐annually	  according	  to	  rigorous	  scientific	  standards,	  and	  thus	  capture	  a	  representative	  sample	  of	  citizen	  views	  and	  orientations	  across	  the	  region.	  The	  2008	  wave	  of	  surveys	  in	  Central	  America	  was	  conducted	  in	  March	  –	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  international	  food	  price	  crisis,	  and	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  wave	  of	  social	  unrest	  that	  swept	  the	  region	  throughout	  the	  following	  months	  (Gutierrez	  2008;	  LA	  Times	  2008;	  LAPOP	  2008).	  This	  rare	  intersection	  of	  events	  engenders	  the	  unique	  opportunity	  for	  a	  systematic	  investigation	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  propensity	  for	  action	  during	  the	  crisis,	  particularly	  as	  these	  orientations	  relate	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	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mobilization.	  Furthermore,	  this	  opportunity	  not	  only	  enables	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  between	  countries	  where	  protest	  occurred,	  but	  also	  includes	  the	  opportunity	  to	  compare	  findings	  with	  countries	  where	  unrest	  did	  not	  occur,	  as	  citizens	  in	  Costa	  Rica	  and	  Panama	  remained	  quiet	  amidst	  the	  turmoil	  in	  the	  region.	  
	   Cautiously	  speaking,	  however,	  there	  are	  limitations	  to	  the	  proposed	  investigation	  offered	  in	  this	  thesis.	  The	  most	  glaring	  limitation	  is	  that	  the	  data	  will	  not	  allow	  for	  the	  identification	  at	  the	  micro-­‐level	  of	  political	  views	  of	  those	  that	  
actually	  participated	  in	  the	  2008	  Central	  American	  protests.	  Thus,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  the	  analysis	  will	  help	  to	  shed	  any	  light	  on	  political	  orientations	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  that	  lead	  one	  to	  protest	  during	  transitory	  economic	  crises.	  Rather,	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  study	  is	  to	  offer	  insight	  into	  citizen	  political	  views	  at	  the	  aggregate	  national	  level,	  and	  examine	  whether	  the	  overall	  national	  political	  culture	  sheds	  any	  light	  on	  the	  likelihood	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  conflict	  within	  a	  country	  during	  an	  economic,	  and	  particularly	  food	  price,	  crisis.	  A	  second	  limitation	  of	  the	  proposed	  study	  is	  that	  it	  is	  confined	  to	  the	  region	  of	  Central	  America.	  Thus,	  it	  may	  be	  foolhardy	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  can	  be	  generalized	  beyond	  the	  countries	  of	  Central	  America.2	  
	   Ultimately,	  it	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  study	  will	  contribute	  to	  several	  fields	  of	  interest.	  First,	  it	  is	  my	  goal	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis,	  demonstrating	  that	  economic	  crises	  can	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  essay	  does	  not	  include	  the	  entire	  region	  of	  Latin	  America	  and	  the	  Caribbean,	  as	  LAPOP	  surveys	  were	  conducted	  in	  some	  countries	  after	  the	  occurrence	  of	  social	  unrest,	  thus	  minimizing	  the	  ability	  to	  capture	  data	  on	  citizen	  views	  during	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	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engender	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  for	  mobilization	  oriented	  towards	  political	  change.	  Second,	  I	  aim	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  study	  of	  political	  culture	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  contentious	  collective	  action,	  showing	  that	  protest	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  democratic	  polities	  where	  citizen	  hopes	  for	  democracy	  are	  high,	  and	  their	  satisfaction	  with	  how	  democracy	  actually	  works	  in	  their	  country	  low.	  Finally,	  I	  intend	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  food	  insecurity	  and	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  food	  riots	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Ultimately,	  however,	  this	  thesis	  serves	  as	  the	  preliminary	  step	  toward	  outlining	  my	  future	  dissertation	  research	  project.	  
	   The	  development	  of	  this	  thesis	  leads	  to	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  analyze.	  The	  questions	  are	  drawn	  from	  the	  intersection	  of	  three	  bodies	  of	  work	  most	  relevant	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  this	  study:	  foot	  riot,	  political	  culture,	  and	  collective	  action	  studies.	  In	  the	  food	  riot	  literature,	  I	  focus	  mainly	  on	  analyses	  that	  address	  the	  political	  determinants	  of	  both	  historical	  and	  contemporary	  food	  riots.	  For	  studies	  on	  political	  culture,	  I	  ground	  my	  review	  in	  literature	  that	  analyzes	  political	  culture	  in	  contemporary	  democracies	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  contentious	  political	  activity.	  Finally,	  in	  the	  collective	  action	  literature,	  I	  draw	  from	  analyses	  that	  highlight	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  that	  facilitate	  mobilization.	  Moreover,	  when	  possible,	  I	  hone	  in	  on	  analyses	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  Latin	  American	  region.	  	  
	   It	  is	  important,	  however,	  to	  establish	  that	  this	  paper	  does	  not	  include	  an	  exhaustive	  review	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  fields	  of	  literature,	  but	  rather	  serves	  as	  a	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preliminary	  roadmap	  and	  direction	  of	  inquiry	  for	  the	  design	  of	  a	  later	  and	  more	  comprehensive	  review	  and	  analysis.	  Until	  then,	  however,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  preliminary	  overview	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  informs	  the	  framework	  of	  this	  thesis.	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FOOD	  RIOTS:	  CLASSICAL	  AND	  CONTEMPORARY	  
	   Analysts	  have	  long	  noted	  the	  political	  roots	  of	  food	  riots.	  Most	  research	  of	  this	  nature	  focuses	  on	  riots	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  and	  nineteenth	  centuries,	  not	  only	  because	  they	  were	  the	  most	  common	  form	  of	  popular	  protest	  during	  that	  time,	  but	  also	  because	  food	  riots	  triggered	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  political	  transformations	  in	  the	  history	  of	  democracy	  –	  the	  French	  Revolution	  (Bouton	  1993;	  Markoff	  1996).	  As	  Charles	  Tilly	  argues,	  food	  riots	  of	  this	  era	  were	  epiphenomenal	  to	  food	  and	  economic	  hardship.	  In	  reality,	  food	  riots	  reflected	  much	  deeper	  political	  concerns.	  These	  concerns	  were	  largely	  associated	  with	  the	  struggles	  of	  state	  building	  occurring	  during	  that	  time	  (1975:	  392).	  	  
	   The	  emergence	  of	  capitalism	  during	  this	  era	  impacted	  centuries	  old	  social	  and	  economic	  structures	  common	  to	  feudal	  society.	  These	  shifts	  largely	  manifested	  in	  the	  grain	  trade,	  as	  monarchies	  withdrew	  their	  long-­‐standing	  support	  for	  subsistence	  regulation	  in	  favor	  of	  laissez-­‐faire	  economics.	  The	  paternalistic	  nature	  of	  feudal	  structures	  had	  engendered	  the	  belief	  amongst	  people	  that	  food	  was	  an	  entitlement	  for	  everyone,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  one	  could	  afford	  it	  or	  not,	  and,	  further,	  that	  the	  government	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  ensure	  this	  right	  (Bouton	  1993).	  Given	  these	  ideas,	  Bouton	  claims:	  	   The	  wave	  of	  food	  riots	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  late	  seventeenth	  century	  to	  	   the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century	  was,	  we	  have	  learned,	  no	  simple	  visceral	  or	  	   ‘spasmodic’	  reaction	  to	  hunger…we	  cannot	  accept	  uncritically	  the	  simple	  	   equation	  of	  hunger	  equals	  riot.	  Of	  course,	  subsistence	  riots	  correlate	  with	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   short-­‐term	  price	  rises…Not	  all	  price	  rises,	  however,	  nor	  even	  the	  most	  	   dramatic	  price	  rises,	  were	  accompanied	  by	  rioting…rioters	  were	  responding	  	   to	  the	  larger	  structural	  and	  political	  changes	  at	  work	  within	  their	  	   communities.	  (1993:	  15)	  	  
The	  political	  undertone	  of	  the	  riots	  was	  reflected	  through	  the	  way	  rioters	  commonly	  demanded	  that	  food	  be	  sold	  at	  some	  popularly	  held	  sense	  of	  equitable	  price,	  rather	  than	  at	  a	  price	  set	  by	  the	  market.	  Food	  in	  the	  public’s	  eyes	  was	  not	  a	  commodity	  to	  be	  sold	  for	  profit,	  but	  rather	  a	  divine	  right	  entitled	  to	  all	  people.	  Tilly	  furthers	  this	  sentiment	  in	  claiming	  that	  riots	  “occurred	  not	  so	  much	  where	  men	  were	  hungry	  as	  where	  they	  believed	  that	  others	  were	  unjustly	  depriving	  them	  of	  food	  to	  which	  they	  had	  a	  moral	  and	  political	  right”	  (1975:	  389).	  	  
	   Furthermore,	  not	  only	  had	  traditional	  grain	  regulations	  mitigated	  wild	  price	  fluctuations,	  but	  they	  also	  “indicated	  political	  commitment	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  local	  welfare”	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  authorities	  (Bouton	  1993:	  11).	  Thus,	  when	  grain	  prices	  rose	  in	  a	  newly	  freed	  market,	  the	  subsistence	  question	  became	  a	  political,	  and	  largely	  national,	  phenomenon	  for	  which	  the	  people	  viewed	  the	  government	  responsible.	  Ultimately,	  it	  was	  these	  processes	  that	  solidified	  food	  riots	  of	  the	  classical	  era	  in	  a	  critique	  of	  national	  policy	  and	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  transformative	  political	  change	  (Bouton	  1993:	  255).	  
	   Moreover,	  William	  Sewell	  (2011)	  underscores	  the	  idea	  that	  harvest	  induced	  crises	  incited	  major	  political	  transitions	  of	  that	  era,	  such	  as	  the	  French	  Revolution	  and	  the	  revolutionary	  activity	  that	  occurred	  throughout	  Europe	  during	  1848	  (2011:	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4-­‐5).	  Yet,	  while	  Sewell	  points	  to	  the	  continuing	  significance	  of	  economic	  crises	  for	  political	  change	  in	  the	  contemporary	  era,	  he	  relegates	  politically	  relevant	  harvest	  crises	  to	  a	  particular	  historical	  juncture	  in	  the	  development	  of	  capitalism.	  Markoff	  (2011),	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  while	  supporting	  Sewell’s	  attention	  to	  the	  enduring	  political	  resonance	  of	  economic	  crises,	  adds	  that	  recent	  events	  such	  as	  spikes	  in	  international	  food	  prices	  and	  the	  potential	  impacts	  of	  climate	  change	  indicate	  that	  politically	  resonant	  harvest	  crises	  are	  probably	  “coming	  back	  with	  a	  bang.”	  	  
	   Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994)	  help	  to	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  food	  riot	  as	  a	  popular	  political	  strategy.	  They	  explain	  that	  as	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  progressed,	  food	  riots	  as	  a	  primary	  form	  of	  protest	  tended	  to	  occur	  alongside	  demonstrations	  related	  to	  labor	  issues.	  As	  unions	  and	  more	  centrally	  organized	  social	  movements	  became	  more	  prominent,	  the	  food	  riot	  as	  a	  political	  strategy	  diminished	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:	  35).	  Furthermore,	  food	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  became	  a	  less	  salient	  issue,	  as	  improvements	  in	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  food	  lowered	  prices	  and	  lessened	  the	  threat	  of	  famine;	  as	  state	  expansion	  minimized	  state-­‐society	  paternalistic	  arrangements;	  and	  as	  state	  centralization	  and	  industrialization	  shifted	  the	  target	  of	  popular	  grievances	  to	  national	  labor	  struggles	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:	  37).	  	  
	   More	  broadly	  speaking,	  prior	  to	  industrialization	  in	  Europe,	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  entire	  economy	  hinged	  on	  the	  production	  of	  food.	  If	  food	  was	  scarce	  or	  prices	  high,	  there	  was	  limited	  ability	  for	  people	  to	  purchase	  other	  goods	  and	  services,	  governments	  to	  collect	  taxes,	  and	  merchants	  and	  states	  to	  pay	  employees	  or	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creditors.	  However,	  as	  the	  industrialization	  of	  European	  economies	  progressed	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  capitalist	  cycles	  of	  expansion	  and	  contraction	  hinged	  less	  on	  the	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  food	  prices,	  and	  more	  on	  the	  demand	  for	  industrial	  goods.3	  Thus,	  given	  these	  far-­‐reaching	  processes,	  it	  seemed	  that	  the	  food	  riot’s	  place	  was	  in	  the	  dustbin	  of	  history	  (Hobsbawm	  1959).	  	  
	   Despite	  declarations	  that	  the	  food	  riot	  was	  a	  thing	  of	  the	  past,	  events	  of	  the	  late	  twentieth	  and	  early	  twenty-­‐first	  centuries	  lay	  this	  claim	  to	  rest.	  To	  begin	  with,	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1970s	  through	  the	  early	  1990s,	  a	  wave	  of	  riots	  spanned	  the	  developing	  world	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:	  39-­‐40).	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  claim	  that	  these	  riots	  are	  reminiscent	  of	  classical	  food	  riots	  in	  the	  way	  that	  the	  protests	  were	  triggered	  by	  food	  price	  increases	  and	  by	  the	  elimination	  of	  state	  protective	  measures	  for	  consumer	  goods	  and	  services	  (1994:	  50).	  They	  also	  offer	  that	  the	  resurgence	  of	  this	  manner	  of	  protest	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  style	  of	  developmental	  policy	  adopted	  by	  developing	  countries	  during	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  As	  developing	  states	  embraced	  an	  industrial	  and	  export-­‐based	  policy	  focus,	  the	  urban	  bias	  of	  these	  efforts	  engendered	  a	  populist	  coalition	  between	  the	  state	  and	  urban	  classes,	  such	  that	  the	  state	  provided	  public	  assistance	  in	  exchange	  for	  political	  loyalty.	  The	  resurgence	  of	  food	  riots	  indicates	  that	  this	  social	  pact	  collapsed	  as	  the	  debt	  crisis	  unfolded	  and	  urban	  masses	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  demanding	  the	  state	  uphold	  its	  end	  of	  the	  bargain	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:	  47).	  	  
	   Advancing	  this	  explanation,	  Walton	  and	  Ragin	  (1990)	  provide	  empirical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Thank	  you	  to	  John	  Markoff	  for	  clarifying	  this	  idea	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evidence	  that	  shows	  that	  the	  occurrence	  and	  severity	  of	  protests	  during	  this	  period	  were	  associated	  with	  hyperurbanization	  and	  levels	  of	  external	  debt.	  As	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  emphasize,	  “the	  mechanism	  linking	  overurbanization	  and	  protest	  is	  a	  well-­‐developed	  organizational	  infrastructure	  capable	  of	  mobilizing	  political	  action”	  (1994:	  45).	  These	  factors	  were	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  Latin	  America,	  as	  over	  the	  twenty	  odd	  year	  period	  of	  concern,	  the	  region	  experienced	  the	  highest	  rate	  of	  popular	  unrest	  compared	  to	  other	  regions	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  contributed	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  worldwide	  total	  of	  protest	  events	  (Walton	  and	  Shefner	  1994:	  106).	  Drawing	  on	  this	  data,	  Walton	  and	  Shefner	  argue	  that	  the	  “results	  suggest	  that	  international	  interventions	  in	  Latin	  American	  societies	  in	  the	  form	  of	  austerity	  programs	  combine	  with	  domestic	  structures	  that	  make	  vulnerable	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  who	  are	  already	  organized	  in	  urban	  communities”	  (1994:	  118).	  	  
	   Yet,	  the	  authors	  also	  point	  to	  the	  prospects	  for	  democratic	  change	  that	  these	  conditions	  created.	  They	  claim	  that	  instead	  of	  triggering	  enduring	  political	  instability	  throughout	  the	  region,	  the	  debt	  crisis	  and	  ensuing	  protests	  invigorated	  civil	  society	  networks	  in	  Latin	  America	  that	  were	  poised	  to	  push	  for	  democratic	  change	  (Walton	  and	  Shefner:	  1994:	  131).	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  extend	  this	  idea:	  
	   Urban	  political	  movements	  have	  begun	  to	  press	  a	  new	  set	  of	  expectations	  in	  	   which	  popular	  sovereignty	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  austerity.	  If	  everyone	  is	  expected	  	   to	  sacrifice	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  economic	  reform,	  then	  everyone	  should	  have	  a	  	   voice	  in	  deciding	  how	  sacrifice	  is	  meted	  out	  and	  what	  reforms	  are	  adopted…In	  	   many	  instances,	  movements	  for	  multiparty	  democracy	  follow	  directly	  in	  the	  
	   17	  
	   wake	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  programs	  and	  food	  riots	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  channel	  	   protest	  mobilization	  into	  longer	  term	  remedial	  directions.	  (1994:	  337)	  
	   Arezki	  and	  Brückner	  (2011),	  however,	  paint	  a	  different	  picture	  of	  contemporary	  food	  riots	  with	  evidence	  that	  demonstrates	  a	  deleterious	  effect	  on	  democracy	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries	  as	  a	  result	  of	  food	  price	  shocks.	  Utilizing	  panel	  data	  of	  over	  120	  different	  countries	  across	  the	  1970	  -­‐	  2007	  time	  period,	  the	  authors	  find	  that	  increases	  in	  international	  food	  prices	  lead	  to	  a	  significant	  deterioration	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  political	  instability	  in	  low-­‐income	  countries.	  Furthermore,	  they	  show	  that	  increases	  in	  international	  food	  prices	  have	  significant	  macroeconomic	  effects,	  such	  that	  they	  were	  associated	  with	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  rich	  and	  poor.	  Thus,	  these	  results	  show	  that	  democratic	  change	  that	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  economic	  shocks	  does	  not	  always	  follow	  a	  progressive	  trajectory.	  
	   On	  another	  note,	  in	  their	  analysis	  of	  riots	  in	  North	  Africa	  and	  the	  Middle	  East	  during	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century,	  Lagi	  et	  al	  (2011)	  present	  evidence	  that	  identifies	  a	  food	  price	  threshold	  above	  which	  riots	  occurred	  in	  the	  region.	  They	  maintain	  their	  results	  indicate	  that,	  “widespread	  unrest	  does	  not	  arise	  from	  long-­‐standing	  political	  failings	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  rather	  from	  its	  sudden	  perceived	  failure	  to	  provide	  essential	  security	  to	  the	  population”	  (2011:	  2).	  Yet,	  showing	  a	  significant	  temporal	  correlation	  between	  food	  price	  spikes	  and	  mobilization,	  the	  authors	  also	  claim	  that	  food	  price	  spikes	  triggered	  the	  enduring	  mobilization	  of	  the	  Arab	  Spring	  (2011:	  4).	  Indeed,	  a	  conclusion	  that	  indicates	  the	  deeper	  political	  nature	  of	  food	  riots.	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   Additionally,	  Berezneva	  and	  Lee	  (2011)	  demonstrate	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  human	  poverty	  and	  fewer	  political	  freedoms	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  protest	  across	  countries	  in	  Africa	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  food	  price	  crisis.	  They	  offer	  that	  a	  country’s	  level	  of	  political	  freedoms	  signals	  the	  degree	  of	  democracy	  within	  that	  country,	  thereby	  implying	  that,	  “As	  personal	  freedoms	  increase,	  fewer	  people	  desire	  revolutionary	  change”	  (2011:	  22).	  Furthermore,	  the	  authors	  claim	  that	  a	  common	  complaint	  amongst	  the	  protestors	  in	  Africa	  during	  the	  food	  price	  crisis	  was	  dissatisfaction	  with	  government	  policies	  and	  corruption.	  Thus,	  Berezneva	  and	  Lee	  suggest	  that	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  protests	  stem	  from	  pressures	  for	  democratization	  in	  African	  countries	  (2011:	  23).	  
	   In	  sum,	  we	  can	  conclude	  from	  a	  preliminary	  review	  of	  the	  food	  riot	  literature	  that	  food	  price	  spikes	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  facilitating	  contentious	  political	  activity	  and	  also	  impact	  the	  prospects	  for	  democratic	  change.	  While	  the	  evidence	  is	  mixed	  regarding	  whether	  the	  outcomes	  of	  food-­‐price	  induced	  protest	  lead	  to	  progressive	  or	  deleterious	  democratic	  change,	  we	  can	  nonetheless	  infer	  that,	  often,	  food	  riots	  are	  a	  manifestation	  of	  citizen	  aspirations	  for	  deep	  political	  change.	  	  
	   Yet,	  there	  exists	  little	  systematic	  research	  on	  the	  scope	  of	  citizen	  views	  and	  hopes	  for	  change	  as	  they	  manifest	  during	  such	  events.	  Further,	  there	  exists	  little	  systematic	  research	  on	  the	  association	  of	  those	  views	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  propensity	  for	  mobilization	  to	  occur	  during	  economic,	  and	  particularly	  food	  price,	  crises.	  Given	  this	  state	  of	  the	  literature,	  these	  inquiries	  form	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  thesis,	  and	  a	  plan	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  answers	  is	  spelled	  out	  below.	  But,	  first,	  I	  turn	  to	  a	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review	  of	  the	  political	  culture	  literature	  that	  helps	  to	  sharpen	  my	  direction	  for	  research.	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POLITICAL	  CULTURE	  AND	  CONTENTIOUS	  POLITICS	  IN	  LATIN	  AMERICA	  
	   There	  exists	  a	  wealth	  of	  sociological	  research	  concerned	  with	  processes	  of	  political	  change,	  and	  particularly	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  cultural	  orientations	  can	  facilitate	  or	  retard	  democratic	  transitions.	  Thus,	  insights	  from	  this	  literature	  can	  help	  to	  outline	  a	  path	  of	  inquiry	  for	  the	  investigation	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  these	  views	  can	  have	  on	  facilitating	  political	  change.	  While	  research	  on	  this	  subject	  is	  extensive,	  and	  the	  factors	  germane	  to	  political	  transition	  processes	  complex,	  I	  narrow	  the	  following	  preliminary	  review	  to	  literature	  that	  focuses	  on	  analyses	  of	  contemporary	  civil	  society	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  on	  the	  most	  recent	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  political	  culture	  in	  contemporary	  democracies	  (see	  Norris	  2011).	  
	   To	  begin	  with,	  many	  analysts	  point	  to	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  contemporary	  civil	  society	  in	  Latin	  America.	  Particularly,	  Vanden	  (2008)	  points	  to	  a	  “political	  sea	  change”	  in	  the	  region	  that	  is	  manifest	  in	  the	  ascendancy	  of	  new,	  progressive	  political	  parties	  and	  in	  civil	  society	  networks	  oriented	  toward	  the	  elimination	  of	  corrupt	  government	  and	  to	  the	  advancement	  of	  democratization	  processes.	  These	  changes,	  he	  claims,	  have	  created	  the	  political	  space	  necessary	  for	  mass	  public	  mobilization	  and	  for	  the	  growth	  of	  social	  movements	  poised	  to	  push	  for	  democratic	  change	  (2008:	  42).	  Alvarez	  et	  al	  (1998)	  further	  that	  the	  creation	  of	  this	  political	  space	  in	  the	  region	  is	  a	  result	  of	  the	  shrinking	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  societal	  affairs.	  This	  process,	  they	  argue,	  prioritizes	  civil	  society	  as	  the	  central	  domain	  for	  the	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exercise	  of	  democratic	  citizenship,	  and	  ultimately	  serves	  to	  politicize	  citizens	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  through	  the	  way	  it	  democratizes	  the	  actions	  of	  daily	  life.	  	  
	   Moreover,	  Escobar	  and	  Alvarez	  (1992)	  claim	  that	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  movements	  in	  the	  region	  reflects	  a	  deepening	  of	  democratic	  citizenship,	  and	  signifies	  the	  creation	  of	  more	  politically	  empowered	  citizens.	  These	  conditions	  are	  critical,	  they	  maintain,	  for	  extending	  and	  deepening	  democratization	  processes	  within	  the	  region.	  Yet,	  other	  analysts	  claim	  that	  caution	  must	  be	  heeded	  in	  attaching	  democratizing	  resonance	  to	  the	  emerging	  culture	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  active	  civil	  society	  networks	  in	  the	  region.	  For	  instance,	  Hellman	  (2008)	  argues	  that	  contemporary	  popular	  movements	  in	  Mexico	  have	  not	  brought	  about	  significant	  openings	  within	  the	  country’s	  political	  system.	  She	  furthers	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	  “the	  development	  of	  popular	  movements	  represents	  a	  less	  dramatic	  and	  significant	  departure	  from	  clientelism	  than	  other	  analysts	  have	  appreciated”	  (2008:	  65).	  Additionally,	  Auyero	  (2007)	  underscores	  the	  central	  role	  that	  patronage	  political	  networks	  play	  in	  facilitating	  social	  conflict	  and	  political	  change	  within	  the	  region.	  He	  maintains	  that	  while	  the	  clandestine	  nature	  of	  these	  networks	  leaves	  them	  hidden	  to	  inquiry,	  that	  the	  enduring	  political	  significance	  of	  these	  associations	  cannot	  be	  ignored.	  	  
	   While	  the	  rise	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  active	  civil	  society	  can	  indeed	  problematize	  citizen	  struggles	  for	  democracy	  in	  the	  region,	  Norris’	  (2011)	  also	  adds	  that	  popular	  demands	  for	  democracy	  must	  be	  prudently	  examined.	  She	  claims	  that,	  “public	  expressions	  of	  support	  for	  democratic	  principles,	  and	  evaluations	  of	  the	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democratic	  performance	  of	  government	  in	  their	  own	  country,	  should	  be	  carefully	  interpreted,	  as	  people	  do	  endorse	  democracy	  for	  different	  reasons”	  (2011:	  167).	  She	  argues	  that	  careful	  analysis	  of	  those	  views	  is	  required	  to	  engender	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  citizen	  orientations	  germane	  to	  the	  complex	  processes	  of	  political	  change	  and	  democratization	  that	  occur	  in	  different	  regions	  of	  the	  world.	  	  
	   Drawing	  from	  the	  results	  of	  her	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  citizen	  views	  on	  democracy	  across	  the	  world,	  she	  reveals	  that	  there	  exists	  a	  diversity	  of	  orientations	  regarding	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  people	  understand,	  evaluate,	  and	  aspire	  for	  democratic	  principles	  in	  their	  own	  country.	  First,	  she	  offers	  that	  a	  procedural	  understanding	  of	  democratic	  processes	  is	  more	  common	  across	  the	  world	  than	  an	  intrinsic	  understanding	  of	  democracy.	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  most	  people	  commonly	  understand	  democracy	  to	  be	  related	  to	  good	  governance	  principles,	  such	  as	  effective	  administration	  of	  material	  benefits	  through	  improved	  standards	  of	  living	  and	  public	  services,	  and	  through	  the	  maintenance	  of	  law	  and	  public	  safety.	  This	  understanding	  is	  more	  common	  than	  one	  based	  on	  intrinsic	  democratic	  processes	  such	  as	  the	  existence	  of	  political	  competition	  and	  popular	  participation.	  Regarding	  Latin	  America,	  Norris	  (2011)	  also	  notes	  that	  indeed	  citizens	  more	  commonly	  associate	  democracy	  with	  instrumental	  notions	  of	  governance,	  such	  as	  fighting	  crime	  and	  redistributing	  wealth,	  rather	  than	  on	  intrinsic	  ideas	  of	  political	  processes	  described	  above	  (e.g.	  see	  Moreno	  2002).	  	  
	   In	  a	  similar	  vein,	  Norris	  (2011)	  presents	  evidence	  that	  demonstrates	  people’s	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  democratic	  performance	  of	  their	  government	  also	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largely	  reflects	  an	  emphasis	  on	  good	  quality	  governance	  measures.	  Both	  of	  these	  findings	  are	  particularly	  important	  to	  the	  study	  proposed	  here,	  as	  the	  economic	  effect	  of	  sharp	  increases	  in	  food	  prices	  may	  indeed	  impact	  people’s	  perceptions	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  democracy	  in	  their	  country	  during	  such	  events.	  As	  food	  prices	  rise,	  people	  may	  associate	  these	  trends	  with	  a	  deterioration	  of	  the	  democratic	  performance	  of	  their	  governments,	  rather	  than	  solely	  via	  the	  natural	  ebbs	  and	  flow	  of	  the	  market.	  Furthermore,	  Norris	  adds	  that	  good	  governance	  carries	  significant	  weight	  for	  prospects	  of	  political	  change	  in	  Latin	  America	  as	  “the	  rise	  of	  corrupt	  leadership,	  election	  fraud,	  bribery,	  and	  clientelism	  has	  also	  been	  regarded	  as	  deeply	  detrimental	  to	  the	  consolidation	  of	  democracy	  and	  to	  economic	  development”	  in	  the	  region	  (Norris	  2011:	  175).	  Indeed,	  an	  idea	  underscored	  in	  Hellman	  (2008)	  and	  Auyero’s	  (2007)	  analyses.	  
	   Scholars	  have	  long	  been	  grappling	  with	  trying	  to	  explain	  the	  emergence	  of	  and	  differences	  in	  democratic	  values.	  Norris	  (2011)	  points	  to	  two	  main	  theoretical	  genres	  that	  dominate	  contemporary	  discussions	  of	  this	  matter	  –	  modernization	  and	  social	  capital	  theories.	  Modernization	  theorists	  posit	  that	  processes	  of	  societal	  and	  human	  development	  encourage	  the	  growth	  of	  “post-­‐materialist”	  and	  “self-­‐expression”	  values,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  tendency	  for	  citizens	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  direct	  and	  unconventional	  forms	  of	  political	  activism.	  This	  theoretical	  orientation	  reflects	  what	  collective	  action	  scholars	  point	  to	  in	  explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  “new”	  social	  movements	  that	  are	  oriented	  toward	  more	  values	  than	  grievance	  based	  claims.	   Surprisingly,	  however,	  Norris	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  modernization	  theory	  furnishes	  only	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  intrinsically	  oriented	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democratic	  values	  amongst	  citizens,	  such	  that	  educational	  level	  and	  associational	  activism	  help	  to	  predict	  these	  understandings,	  while	  age	  and	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  human	  development	  do	  not	  (2011:	  121).	  Norris	  adds,	  however,	  that	  modernization	  theories	  do	  seem	  to	  provide	  an	  explanation	  for	  more	  long-­‐term	  glacial	  shifts	  in	  democratic	  values,	  than	  the	  dynamic	  ebb	  and	  flow	  of	  political	  attitudes	  in	  shorter-­‐term	  trajectories	  (Norris	  2011:	  136).	  World	  culture	  theorists	  add	  to	  this	  idea,	  claiming	  that	  a	  globalized	  culture	  exists	  that	  encompasses	  and	  promotes	  people’s	  association	  with	  values	  of	  individual	  rights,	  political	  participation	  and	  democracy.	  	  Thus,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  this	  cultural	  framework	  operates	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  the	  emergence	  worldwide	  of	  social	  movements	  that	  are	  oriented	  toward	  democratic	  change	  and	  articulated	  in	  local	  settings	  should	  be	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  (Boli	  and	  Thomas	  1997:	  173).	  These	  conclusions	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  changes	  in,	  or	  the	  endurance	  of,	  certain	  political	  attitudes	  that	  occur	  during	  transitory	  economic	  crises.	  Speaking	  to	  this	  idea,	  Norris	  argues	  that	  a	  more	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  political	  values	  must	  include	  a	  consideration	  of	  both	  the	  effect	  of	  macro-­‐level	  factors	  such	  as	  development	  and	  world	  culture,	  as	  well	  as	  more	  complex	  micro-­‐level	  factors	  such	  as	  associational	  activism	  (2011:	  123).	  This	  is	  a	  suggestion	  this	  proposal	  seeks	  to	  heed.	  
	   Social	  capital	  theories	  attempt	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  more	  complex	  micro-­‐level	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  and	  change	  in	  democratic	  values.	  Particularly,	  these	  theories	  emphasize	  the	  role	  that	  dense	  community	  networks	  play	  in	  fostering	  interpersonal	  trust	  and	  civic	  engagement,	  two	  factors	  believed	  to	  give	  rise	  to	  a	  culture	  in	  which	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  form	  coalitions	  and	  push	  for	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political	  change.	  Furthermore,	  coalitional	  activity	  is	  reinforcing	  for	  the	  development	  of	  democratic	  values,	  as	  engaging	  in	  such	  activity	  is	  believed	  to	  facilitate	  the	  emergence	  of	  self-­‐expression	  values,	  social	  trust,	  and	  associational	  activism,	  all	  orientations	  germane	  to	  democratic	  values	  (Norris	  2011).	  	  
	   Testing	  the	  social	  capital	  thesis,	  Norris	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  results	  confirm	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  capital	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  democratic	  values.	  She	  shows	  that	  “generalized	  social	  trust	  and	  associational	  activism	  were	  both	  positively	  linked	  with	  stronger	  democratic	  aspirations	  and	  also	  with	  greater	  democratic	  satisfaction”	  (Norris	  2011:	  137).	  Thus,	  these	  results	  provide	  empirical	  support	  for	  the	  ideas	  discussed	  above	  that	  social	  movement	  activity	  in	  Latin	  America	  both	  problematizes	  and	  facilitates	  the	  emergence	  of	  democratic	  values	  in	  citizens	  throughout	  the	  region.	  However,	  as	  Norris	  notes,	  more	  careful	  analysis	  is	  required	  to	  engender	  a	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  these	  orientations	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  complex	  processes	  of	  political	  change	  that	  occur	  in	  different	  regions	  around	  the	  world.	  
	   Yet,	  what	  do	  different	  democratic	  orientations	  imply	  for	  the	  occurrence	  of	  contentious	  political	  activity?	  Norris	  (2011)	  emphasizes	  that	  political	  disaffection	  is	  a	  widely	  held	  assumption	  to	  explain	  citizen	  engagement	  in	  public	  forms	  of	  protest	  in	  democratic	  polities.	  However,	  she	  claims	  that	  the	  data	  show	  that	  the	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  may	  not	  be	  so	  simple:	  
	   The	  actual	  evidence	  linking	  democratic	  orientations	  with	  patterns	  of	  political	  	   activism	  is	  far	  from	  straightforward;	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  	   democracy	  may	  depress	  conventional	  forms	  of	  participation,	  but	  alternatively	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   it	  may	  also	  mobilize	  people,	  for	  example	  to	  support	  reform	  movements.	  	   (2011:	  17)	  
Speaking	  to	  a	  more	  regionally	  nuanced	  analysis	  of	  this	  phenomenon,	  she	  offers:	  
	   In	  Latin	  America,	  for	  example,	  Booth	  and	  Seligson	  (2009)	  report	  that	  citizens	  	   who	  are	  unhappy	  with	  their	  government’s	  performance	  do	  not	  drop	  out	  of	  	   politics	  or	  resort	  to	  protest	  politics.	  Rather,	  disaffected	  citizens	  in	  Latin	  	   America	  participate	  at	  high	  rates	  in	  conventional	  and	  alternative	  political	  	   arenas.	  (2011:	  17)	  
These	  conclusions	  thus	  corroborate	  the	  need	  to	  dig	  beneath	  the	  surface	  of	  social	  movements	  and	  popular	  forms	  of	  protest	  to	  gain	  a	  deeper	  and	  more	  inclusive	  understanding	  of	  citizen	  views	  on	  democracy	  and	  orientations	  toward	  political	  change.	  	  
	   Some	  generalizations	  can	  be	  made,	  however,	  regarding	  the	  occurrence	  of	  contentious	  politics	  in	  contemporary	  democracies.	  For	  instance,	  Norris	  (2011)	  shows	  that	  gender,	  income	  and	  education	  level,	  and	  knowledge	  about	  democracy	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  greater	  propensity	  to	  engage	  in	  protest	  activism.	  At	  the	  macro-­‐level,	  she	  demonstrates	  that	  in	  countries	  with	  a	  long	  history	  of	  democracy	  “where	  there	  are	  well-­‐established	  traditional	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  to	  assemble	  and	  demonstrate	  peacefully,”	  the	  occurrence	  of	  protest	  politics	  is	  also	  more	  likely	  (2011:	  224).	  Norris	  also	  shows	  that	  citizens	  with	  higher	  aspirations	  for	  democracy	  and	  those	  that	  were	  more	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  way	  democracy	  worked	  in	  their	  country	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  engage	  in	  contentious	  politics	  (2011:	  224-­‐5).	  Further,	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as	  people	  get	  involved	  in	  contentious	  politics	  and	  organized	  movements,	  they	  also	  learn	  more	  about	  and	  become	  committed	  to	  democracy	  and	  democratic	  procedures	  (Smith	  2007).	  Thus,	  the	  results	  indicate	  that	  on	  an	  aggregate	  level,	  contentious	  political	  activity	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  democratic	  polities	  where	  citizen	  hopes	  for	  democracy	  are	  high,	  and	  their	  satisfaction	  with	  how	  democracy	  actually	  works	  in	  their	  country	  low.	  	  
	   Surveying	  the	  results	  presented	  above,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  citizen	  political	  views	  matter	  for	  prospects	  for	  democracy,	  and	  for	  the	  likelihood	  of	  occurrence	  of	  contentious	  activity	  oriented	  towards	  facilitating	  political	  change.	  Yet,	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  orientations,	  structural	  factors	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  protest	  must	  also	  be	  considered.	  It	  is	  to	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  that	  speaks	  to	  this	  issue	  that	  I	  turn	  to	  next.	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POLITICAL	  OPPORTUNITY	  STRUCTURES	  AND	  COLLECTIVE	  ACTION	  
	   While	  ideological	  orientations	  are	  key	  in	  explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  protest,	  structural	  factors	  that	  help	  to	  engender	  opportunities	  for	  collection	  action	  are	  also	  important.	  Insights	  from	  both	  the	  social	  movement	  and	  economic	  literature	  can	  help	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  of	  these	  structural	  factors,	  particularly	  as	  they	  relate	  to	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  collective	  action	  that	  emerges	  during	  transitory	  economic	  crises.	  	  	  
	   The	  most	  parallel	  theory	  in	  the	  social	  movement	  literature	  to	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2006)	  concept	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  is	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  The	  political	  opportunity	  orientation	  underscores	  the	  “importance	  of	  the	  broader	  political	  system	  in	  structuring	  the	  opportunities	  for	  collective	  action”	  such	  that	  “changes	  in	  the	  institutional	  structure	  or	  informal	  power	  relations	  of	  a	  given	  national	  political	  system”	  give	  rise,	  or	  constraint,	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  contentious	  collective	  action	  (McAdam	  et	  al	  1996:	  2-­‐3).	  Important	  to	  this	  theoretical	  orientation	  is	  both	  the	  organization	  of	  longer-­‐term	  structures	  as	  well	  as	  more	  immediate	  shifts	  in	  the	  political	  system	  that	  create	  a	  perception	  amongst	  citizens	  that	  the	  costs	  to	  mobilization	  are	  low,	  and	  returns	  potentially	  high.	  	  
	   One	  of	  the	  primary	  long-­‐term	  structures	  believed	  to	  facilitate	  social	  movement	  activity	  is	  the	  relative	  level	  of	  openness	  of	  a	  political	  system.	  Open	  polities	  are	  those	  in	  which	  “there	  are	  well-­‐established	  traditional	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  to	  assemble	  and	  demonstrate	  peacefully”	  (Norris	  2011:	  224).	  While	  more	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open	  polities	  coincide	  with	  older	  democracies,	  younger	  democracies	  with	  a	  legacy	  of	  successful	  social	  movement	  activity	  can	  also	  be	  fertile	  ground	  for	  contentious	  politics	  (Escobar	  and	  Alvarez	  1992;	  Stahler-­‐Sholk	  et	  al	  2008).	  	  
	   Theorists	  also	  underscore	  broader	  societal	  trends	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  social	  movement	  activity.	  For	  example,	  in	  his	  seminal	  study	  of	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Movement,	  McAdam	  (1982)	  shows	  how	  “changes	  in	  demography,	  repression,	  migration,	  and	  political	  economy	  contributed	  to	  a	  climate	  in	  which	  African	  Americans	  could	  organize	  collective	  action,	  and	  claims	  about	  racial	  justice	  
would	  be	  more	  readily	  received	  by	  at	  least	  some	  governmental	  institutions”	  (Meyer	  and	  Minkoff	  2004:1459).	  Furthermore,	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution,	  Markoff	  (1996)	  argues	  that	  broader	  structural	  changes	  not	  only	  generated	  more	  public	  acceptance	  of	  the	  central	  state,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  Estates	  General	  elections	  created	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  peasant-­‐legislator	  coalition.	  This	  coalition	  facilitated	  radical	  antiseigneurialism	  and	  alliances	  that	  supported	  new	  institution	  building,	  ultimately	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  a	  democratic	  revolution.	  Moreover,	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  can	  be	  multiple	  and	  contextual	  (Kutz-­‐Flamembaum	  2012).	  For	  example,	  drawing	  on	  her	  analysis	  of	  Machsom	  Watch,	  an	  Israeli	  Women’s	  peace	  organization,	  Kutz-­‐Flamenbaum	  argues	  that	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  are	  “bound	  by	  cultural	  norms	  that	  create	  distinct	  sets	  of	  opportunities	  and	  constraints	  for	  different	  groups	  of	  people”	  (2012:	  293).	  Given	  this	  notion,	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  can	  take	  on	  different	  forms	  for	  different	  people,	  ultimately	  shaping	  in	  a	  diverse	  manner	  the	  way	  people	  act	  upon	  perceived	  openings	  or	  constraints	  in	  the	  political	  system.	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   On	  another	  level,	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  can	  be	  facilitated	  by	  more	  immediate,	  rather	  than	  long-­‐term,	  changes.	  In	  a	  fascinating	  analysis	  of	  food	  riots	  that	  swept	  through	  Argentina	  in	  2001,	  Javier	  Auyero	  (2007)	  locates	  the	  emergence	  of	  opportunities	  for	  action	  in	  routine	  patronage	  politics	  whose	  clandestine	  networks	  were	  activated	  by	  political	  brokers.	  Auyero	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  opportunity	  to	  riot	  emerged	  via	  the	  spreading	  of	  “rumors”	  by	  political	  brokers	  amongst	  neighbors,	  friends	  and	  family	  who	  instructed	  one	  another	  to	  meet	  at	  a	  certain	  place	  and	  time,	  and	  to	  loot	  one	  store	  and	  not	  another.	  He	  also	  shows	  that	  political	  brokers	  then	  capitalized	  on	  a	  window	  of	  opportunity	  created	  by	  the	  riots	  to	  incite	  massive	  political	  change,	  notably	  the	  end	  of	  the	  presidency	  of	  Fernando	  De	  La	  Rua.	  Finally,	  this	  analysis	  also	  demonstrates	  that	  both	  organic	  and	  synthetic	  forces	  can	  engender	  the	  emergence	  of	  short-­‐term	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  	  	  
	   Transitory	  economic	  crises	  are	  the	  forces	  of	  concern	  of	  this	  thesis	  that	  can	  engender	  the	  emergence	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  An	  obvious	  case	  to	  highlight	  is	  the	  US	  economic	  crisis	  of	  1929	  that	  led	  to	  “a	  more	  pro-­‐active	  management	  of	  the	  economy	  by	  the	  state	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  various	  social	  policies	  embodied	  in	  the	  New	  Deal”	  (Utting	  et	  al	  2012:	  10).	  More	  recently,	  Walton	  and	  Seddon	  (1994)	  illustrate	  that	  the	  global	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  early	  1970s	  led	  to	  both	  an	  international	  wave	  of	  “austerity”	  protests,	  and	  to	  the	  widespread	  implementation	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  policies	  in	  many	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  An	  important	  component	  of	  their	  analysis	  is	  the	  significance	  they	  attach	  to	  structures	  that	  operate	  at	  the	  global	  level,	  and	  to	  the	  reach	  that	  changes	  in	  these	  structures	  can	  have	  worldwide.	  They	  point	  out	  that	  the	  global	  economy	  in	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particular	  has	  become	  much	  more	  integrated	  since	  the	  1970s,	  and	  thus	  vulnerable	  to	  shocks	  not	  limited	  to	  a	  single	  place.	  Thus,	  economic	  crises,	  and	  the	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  they	  can	  engender	  for	  mobilization,	  are	  a	  phenomenon	  relevant	  for	  political	  change	  worldwide.	  
	   Yet,	  how	  do	  economic	  crises	  create	  structural	  changes	  that	  facilitate	  opportunities	  for	  collective	  action?	  It	  is	  helpful	  here	  to	  repeat	  the	  idea	  that	  economic	  crises	  create	  a	  distributional	  conflict	  of	  interest	  between	  the	  more	  asset	  wealthy	  elite	  and	  more	  asset	  poor	  majority	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson	  2006).	  The	  emergence	  of	  a	  conflict	  of	  interest	  during	  a	  crisis	  indicates	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  crisis,	  a	  society	  had	  settled	  into	  a	  Pareto-­‐inferior	  equilibrium,	  meaning	  that	  the	  economic	  arrangements	  of	  that	  society	  were	  not	  welfare	  maximizing	  (Drazen	  and	  Grilli	  1993).	  Drazen	  and	  Grilli	  claim	  that	  breaking	  such	  an	  un-­‐optimal	  arrangement	  and	  putting	  a	  society	  on	  a	  welfare-­‐maximizing	  path	  is	  often	  only	  possible	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  distress	  caused	  by	  an	  economic	  crisis.	  This	  is	  because	  “the	  extreme	  welfare	  loss	  that	  each	  agent	  suffers	  in	  a	  crisis	  dwarfs	  the	  loss	  he	  may	  associate	  with	  an	  unfavorable	  distribution	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  a	  major	  policy	  change”	  (1993:	  598).	  	  
	   According	  to	  Alesina	  and	  Drazen	  (1991),	  this	  distress	  manifests	  during	  economic	  crises	  as	  a	  “war	  of	  attrition.”	  The	  burden	  of	  economic	  stabilization	  engenders	  this	  war	  such	  that:	  
	   When	  socioeconomic	  groups	  perceive	  the	  possibility	  of	  shifting	  this	  burden	  	   elsewhere,	  each	  group	  may	  attempt	  to	  wait	  the	  other	  out.	  This	  war	  of	  	   attrition	  ends,	  and	  a	  stabilization	  is	  enacted,	  when	  certain	  groups	  ‘concede’	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   and	  allow	  their	  political	  opponents	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  the	  burden	  	   of	  fiscal	  adjustment.	  Concession	  may	  occur	  via	  legislative	  agreement,	  	   electoral	  outcomes,	  or	  ceding	  power	  of	  decree	  to	  	  policymakers.	  (Alesina	  and	  	   Drazen	  1991:	  	  1171)	  
	   Drazen	  and	  Grilli	  (1993)	  further	  that	  economic	  crises	  are	  often	  the	  only	  way	  to	  tip	  the	  favor	  to	  the	  majority	  during	  a	  war	  of	  attrition.	  They	  explain	  that,	  “The	  welfare	  losses	  associated	  with	  economic	  distortions	  and	  crises	  enable	  societies	  to	  enact	  measures	  that	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  enact	  in	  less	  distortionary	  circumstances”	  (1993:	  598).	  During	  such	  circumstances,	  distributional	  concessions	  are	  often	  less	  costly	  for	  authorities	  than	  an	  economically	  paralyzed	  populace	  and	  stagnated	  economy.	  Additionally,	  such	  measures	  are	  often	  less	  costly	  for	  elites	  than	  engaging	  in	  repressive	  tactics	  to	  quell	  coinciding	  periods	  of	  social	  unrest.	  	  
	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  cost	  of	  public	  mobilization	  during	  economic	  crises	  is	  often	  lower	  for	  citizens	  than	  passively	  waiting	  the	  authorities	  out,	  as	  an	  acquiescent	  majority	  may	  be	  left	  to	  bear	  the	  burden	  of	  fiscal	  adjustment	  enacted	  for	  stabilization.	  Thus,	  Drazen	  and	  Gilli	  conclude	  that,	  “distortions	  and	  crises	  may	  raise	  welfare	  if	  they	  are	  the	  only	  way	  to	  induce	  necessary	  policy	  changes”	  (1993:	  598).	  This	  welfare	  maximizing	  potential	  of	  economic	  crises	  speaks	  to	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2006)	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis.	  As	  groups	  evaluate	  their	  position	  in	  the	  war	  of	  attrition,	  citizens	  often	  recognize	  during	  such	  events	  that	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  have	  emerged	  that	  may	  lower	  the	  cost	  and	  increase	  the	  returns	  to	  mobilization	  for	  democratic	  change.	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   Yet,	  while	  a	  crisis	  serves	  as	  the	  mechanism	  to	  facilitate	  a	  war	  of	  attrition,	  what	  are	  the	  formal	  structures	  in	  which	  changes	  occur	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity?	  The	  wide	  range	  of	  structures	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  those	  that	  engender	  political	  opportunities	  for	  mobilization	  makes	  providing	  a	  straightforward	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  difficult.	  Yet,	  as	  McAdam	  (1996)	  offers,	  a	  number	  of	  authors	  have	  sought	  to	  distinguish	  some	  relevant	  dimensions	  of	  the	  institutional	  or	  legal	  structures	  of	  a	  given	  political	  system	  that	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  He	  claims	  that	  in	  analyzing	  these	  different	  dimensions,	  a	  fair	  amount	  of	  overlap	  exists	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  enables	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  general	  typology	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  Drawing	  on	  these	  dimensions,	  McAdam	  (1996)	  identifies	  the	  four	  following	  elements	  as	  the	  primary	  structures:	  
1. The	  relative	  open	  or	  closure	  of	  the	  institutionalized	  political	  system	  2. The	  stability	  or	  instability	  of	  that	  broad	  set	  of	  elite	  alignments	  that	  typically	  undergird	  a	  polity	  3. The	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  elite	  allies	  4. The	  state’s	  capacity	  and	  propensity	  for	  repression	  (1996:	  27).	  
	   This	  typology	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  helps	  to	  advance	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  created	  by	  economic	  crises.	  Particularly,	  it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  economic	  crises	  serve	  to	  open	  up	  a	  political	  system	  to	  changes	  not	  previously	  considered	  urgent,	  necessary,	  or	  possible	  to	  enact.	  Economic	  crises	  also	  serve	  to	  undermine	  the	  stability,	  and/or	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existence	  of	  elite	  alliances,	  as	  various	  agents	  seek	  to	  maximize	  their	  position	  in	  the	  war	  of	  attrition,	  and	  thus	  may	  defect	  from	  previous	  coalitions.	  Finally,	  elite	  recourse	  to	  concessionary	  measures	  is	  often	  less	  costly	  than	  repressive	  tactics,	  as	  the	  scale	  of	  social	  conflict	  often	  increases	  during	  such	  crises,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  cost	  of	  repression.	  Briefly	  stated,	  this	  explanation	  of	  McAdam’s	  (1996)	  typology	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  serves	  to	  operationalize	  an	  analysis	  of	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2001,	  2006)	  concept	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  as	  it	  is	  created	  during	  economic	  crises.	  
	   However,	  while	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  may	  help	  to	  explain	  public	  mobilization	  that	  occurs	  during	  economic	  crises,	  many	  analysts	  argue	  that	  this	  theoretical	  orientation	  can	  be	  a	  “catch-­‐all”	  that	  serves	  to	  neglect	  other	  important	  factors	  for	  collective	  action	  (Gamson	  and	  Meyer	  1996).	  McAdam	  et	  al	  (1996)	  argue	  that	  in	  addition	  to	  political	  opportunity	  structures,	  it	  is	  also	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  impact	  of	  mobilizing	  structures	  and	  framing	  processes	  on	  prospects	  for	  mobilization.	  Mobilizing	  structures	  are	  the	  informal	  and	  formal	  networks	  that	  serve	  as	  building	  blocks	  for	  facilitating	  collection	  action.	  For	  instance,	  Tilly	  (1975)	  has	  underscored	  the	  role	  that	  various	  settings	  like	  occupation	  and	  neighborhood	  play	  in	  activating	  and	  spreading	  opportunities	  for	  contentious	  political	  activity.	  Additionally,	  McAdam	  (1982)	  demonstrates	  the	  impact	  of	  local	  black	  institutions	  such	  as	  churches	  and	  colleges	  in	  facilitating	  the	  American	  civil	  rights	  movement.	  Furthermore,	  Auyero	  (2007)	  points	  to	  local	  patronage	  networks	  that	  served	  in	  spreading	  rumors	  to	  incite	  the	  2001	  Argentine	  food	  riots.	  Thus,	  while	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  inciting	  popular	  political	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mobilization,	  those	  structures	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  for	  activating	  networks	  for	  collection	  action.	  Mobilizing	  structures	  serve	  to	  mind	  this	  gap.	  
	   Still,	  other	  analysts	  seek	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  ideas	  create	  the	  impetus	  for	  contentious	  behavior	  just	  as	  significantly	  as	  structural	  conditions.	  This	  orientation	  highlights	  the	  importance	  of	  framing	  processes	  in	  the	  emergence	  of	  contentious	  politics.	  Framing	  process	  are	  “the	  shared	  meanings	  and	  definitions	  that	  people	  bring	  to	  their	  situation”	  (McAdam	  et	  al	  1996:	  5).	  Frames	  are	  “often	  markers	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  are	  reflected	  in	  contemporary	  discourse”	  (Kutz-­‐Flamenbaum	  2012:	  296).	  Key	  to	  framing	  processes	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  actors	  that	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  deliberate	  effort	  to	  shape	  people’s	  understandings	  of	  issues	  and	  political	  developments.	  This	  idea	  underscores	  the	  role	  that	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  play	  in	  facilitating	  framing	  processes	  amongst	  associated	  members	  and	  networks,	  thus	  engendering	  even	  greater	  opportunities	  for	  mobilization.	  Actors	  within	  organizations	  often	  interpret	  and	  disseminate	  frames,	  serving	  as	  the	  bridge	  between	  ideas	  and	  action	  (McCarthy,	  Smith	  and	  Zald	  1996).	  	  	  
	   Framing	  processes	  underscore	  the	  role	  that	  cultural	  elements	  play	  in	  inciting	  mobilization	  such	  that	  collective	  action	  is	  facilitated	  by	  shared	  understandings	  that	  legitimate,	  motivate	  and	  direct	  behavior.	  Indeed,	  this	  study	  engages	  the	  notion	  of	  framing	  processes	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  collection	  action	  for	  democratic	  change	  during	  the	  2008	  food	  crisis	  in	  Central	  America.	  The	  role	  of	  framing	  processes	  can	  help	  explain	  how	  the	  shared	  understandings	  amongst	  citizens	  of	  their	  aspirations	  for	  and	  evaluations	  of	  democracy	  in	  their	  country	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engendered	  collective	  action	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  food	  price	  crisis.	  Furthermore,	  framing	  processes	  can	  also	  help	  to	  illustrate	  the	  development	  of	  a	  shared	  understanding	  amongst	  citizens	  that	  a	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization	  emerged	  during	  the	  event.	  
	   Generally	  speaking,	  the	  application	  of	  the	  political	  opportunity	  structure	  concept	  from	  the	  social	  movement	  literature	  helps	  to	  advance	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis	  in	  the	  economic	  literature.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  aimed	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  above,	  neither	  a	  purely	  ideological	  or	  structural	  approach	  to	  analysis	  can	  explain	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  mobilization	  for	  political	  change	  that	  occurred	  in	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  global	  food	  price	  crisis.	  Thus,	  the	  aim	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  to	  offer	  a	  blueprint	  for	  future	  analysis	  on	  the	  matter	  that	  seeks	  to	  investigate	  both	  the	  impact	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  changing	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  in	  facilitating	  widespread	  social	  unrest	  during	  the	  crisis.	  Now	  I	  turn	  to	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  proposed	  methodology,	  hypotheses	  and	  data	  that	  will	  be	  engaged	  to	  facilitate	  the	  investigation	  proposed	  in	  this	  thesis.	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METHODOLOGY,	  HYPOTHESES	  AND	  DATA	  	  
Methodology	  
	   The	  theoretical	  groundwork	  offered	  above	  points	  to	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  that	  are	  necessary	  to	  analyze	  for	  a	  systematic	  investigation	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  public	  mobilization	  for	  political	  change	  that	  occurred	  in	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  global	  food	  price	  crisis.	  These	  questions	  are	  spelled	  out	  below.	  For	  the	  analysis,	  survey	  data	  will	  be	  used	  from	  the	  2004,	  2006,	  and	  2008	  wave	  of	  the	  Latin	  American	  Public	  Opinion	  Project	  administered	  in	  Costa	  Rica,	  El	  Salvador,	  Guatemala,	  Honduras,	  Nicaragua	  and	  Panama.	  As	  of	  December	  2012,	  all	  data	  will	  be	  available	  for	  public	  use	  free	  of	  charge.	  Additionally,	  various	  macro-­‐level	  variables	  will	  be	  included	  in	  the	  analysis.	  A	  description	  of	  these	  variables	  is	  included	  below.	  	  
	   Because	  the	  data	  employed	  in	  the	  study	  engages	  both	  macro-­‐	  and	  micro-­‐level	  variables,	  the	  optimal	  method	  for	  analysis	  is	  multilevel	  regression	  models	  (see	  Norris	  2011).	  Traditionally,	  most	  analyses	  of	  the	  sort	  proposed	  here	  employ	  Ordinary	  Least	  Squares	  (OLS)	  regression	  models.	  However,	  it	  is	  now	  widely	  understood	  that	  OLS	  models	  can	  produce	  misleading	  results,	  resulting	  in	  exaggerated	  effects	  of	  macro-­‐level	  variables	  (Norris	  2011:	  12).	  Moreover,	  the	  small	  sample	  size	  of	  countries	  (n	  =	  6)	  in	  the	  study	  mitigates	  the	  ability	  to	  utilize	  regression	  analysis	  for	  comparative	  analyses	  between	  countries	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level.	  Thus,	  regression	  analysis	  will	  only	  be	  employed	  for	  analyses	  that	  utilize	  LAPOP	  survey	  data	  for	  each	  country.	  Additional	  tests	  such	  as	  analysis	  of	  variance	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(ANOVA)	  and	  descriptive	  statistics	  will	  be	  used	  for	  the	  comparison	  of	  country	  differences	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level.	  	  
Hypotheses	  and	  data	  
	   The	  following	  section	  includes	  fifteen	  hypotheses	  that	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  above.	  Several	  of	  the	  hypotheses	  below	  suggest	  analysis	  at	  the	  level	  of	  individuals	  –	  these	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  labeled	  with	  an	  “I”	  indicating	  individual	  level	  analysis.	  Others	  suggest	  analysis	  at	  the	  level	  of	  cross-­‐national	  aggregate	  comparisons	  –	  these	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  labeled	  with	  a	  “C”	  indicating	  country	  level	  analysis.	  The	  remaining	  hypotheses	  suggest	  analysis	  at	  both	  the	  individual	  and	  country	  level	  –	  these	  will	  be	  labeled	  with	  an	  “IC.”	  Finally,	  following	  each	  hypothesis	  is	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  variables	  and	  data	  that	  will	  be	  used	  to	  test	  the	  hypothesis.	  
Hypothesis	  1	   	  
	   Analyses	  of	  contemporary	  food	  riots	  link	  higher	  levels	  of	  human	  poverty	  with	  the	  likelihood	  of	  riots	  (Berezneva	  and	  Lee	  2011).	  Furthermore,	  levels	  of	  inequality	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  occurrence	  of	  food	  riots	  that	  occur	  during	  economic	  crises	  (Arezki	  and	  Bruckner	  2011).	  Thus,	  these	  conclusions	  lead	  to	  the	  first	  hypothesis:	  
Hypothesis	  1	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  
poverty	  and	  inequality	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  poverty	  and	  inequality.	  
To	  test	  this	  hypothesis,	  the	  following	  macro-­‐level	  indicators	  of	  poverty	  will	  be	  used:	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• Human	  Poverty	  Index	  (Human	  Development	  Report	  2008)	  
• Gini	  coefficients,	  a	  statistical	  measurement	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  across	  a	  country	  (World	  Bank)	  
Hypotheses	  2-­‐5	  
	   Also	  critical	  to	  the	  analysis	  are	  citizen	  perceptions	  of	  the	  state	  of	  their	  own	  economic	  welfare,	  as	  well	  as	  perceptions	  of	  their	  country’s	  economic	  welfare	  during	  the	  crisis.	  As	  Lagi	  et	  al	  offer,	  “widespread	  unrest	  does	  not	  arise	  from	  long-­‐standing	  political	  failings	  of	  the	  system,	  but	  rather	  from	  its	  sudden	  perceived	  failure	  to	  provide	  essential	  security	  to	  the	  population”	  (2011:	  2).	  In	  the	  same	  vein,	  social	  movement	  theorists	  note	  the	  mobilizing	  impact	  that	  perceptions	  of	  “suddenly	  imposed	  grievances”	  have	  on	  mobilization	  (Laraña	  et	  al	  1994).	  Thus,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  test	  for	  changes	  in	  citizen	  perceptions	  of	  their	  own,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  country’s	  economic	  welfare	  during	  the	  crisis.	  The	  hypotheses	  to	  test	  these	  propositions	  include	  a	  comparative	  analysis	  that	  not	  only	  measures	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  citizen	  perceptions	  of	  economic	  welfare	  between	  countries	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  the	  riots,	  but	  also	  
within	  country	  via	  the	  use	  of	  a	  time	  series	  analysis.	  These	  hypotheses	  include:	  
Hypothesis	  2	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  people	  report	  
high	  levels	  of	  individual	  economic	  insecurity	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  people	  report	  
low	  levels	  of	  individual	  economic	  insecurity.	  
Hypothesis	  3	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  large	  changes	  in	  
perceptions	  of	  individual	  economic	  insecurity	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  small	  changes	  in	  
perceptions	  of	  individual	  economic	  insecurity.	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• LAPOP	  2004,	  2006,	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  IDIO1:	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  
your	  overall	  economic	  situation?	  Would	  you	  say	  that	  it	  is	  very	  good,	  good,	  
neither	  good	  nor	  bad,	  bad	  or	  very	  bad?	  
• LAPOP	  2004,	  2006,	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  IDIO2:	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  your	  
economic	  situation	  is	  better	  than,	  the	  same	  as,	  or	  worse	  than	  it	  was	  12	  months	  
ago?	  
Hypothesis	  4	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  report	  
high	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  national	  economic	  insecurity	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  
report	  low	  levels	  of	  national	  economic	  insecurity.	  
Hypothesis	  5	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  large	  changes	  in	  
citizen	  perceptions	  of	  national	  economic	  insecurity	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  small	  
changes	  in	  citizen	  perceptions	  of	  national	  economic	  insecurity.	  
• LAPOP	  2004,	  2006,	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  SOCT1:	  How	  would	  you	  describe	  
the	  country’s	  economic	  situation?	  Would	  you	  say	  that	  it	  is	  very	  good,	  good,	  
neither	  good	  nor	  bad,	  bad	  or	  very	  bad?	  
• LAPOP	  2004,	  2006,	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  IDIO2:	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  the	  
country’s	  economic	  situation	  is	  better	  than,	  the	  same	  as,	  or	  worse	  than	  it	  was	  
12	  months	  ago?	  
Hypothesis	  6	   	  
	   Drawing	  on	  a	  number	  of	  studies	  discussed	  above	  that	  food	  riots	  are	  a	  manifestation	  of	  citizen	  dissatisfaction	  with	  political	  issues	  deeper	  than	  economic	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security,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  comparatively	  analyze	  citizen	  satisfaction	  with	  their	  governments.	  As	  a	  starting	  point,	  Norris	  (2011)	  finds	  that	  in	  contemporary	  democracies,	  citizen	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  government	  largely	  reflects	  an	  emphasis	  on	  good	  quality	  governance	  procedures.	  These	  procedures	  are	  related	  to	  the	  perceived	  effectiveness	  of	  delivering	  material	  benefits	  through	  improved	  standards	  of	  living	  and	  public	  services,	  and	  through	  fighting	  corruption	  and	  crime.	  Based	  on	  these	  insights,	  we	  are	  lead	  to	  the	  sixth	  hypothesis:	  	  
Hypothesis	  6	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  are	  not	  
satisfied	  with	  the	  instrumental	  performance	  of	  their	  government	  than	  in	  countries	  
where	  people	  are	  satisfied	  with	  the	  instrumental	  performance	  of	  their	  government.	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  N1:	  To	  what	  extent	  would	  you	  say	  the	  current	  
administration	  fights	  poverty?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  N3:	  To	  what	  extent	  would	  you	  say	  the	  current	  
administration	  combats	  government	  corruption?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  N11:	  To	  what	  extent	  would	  you	  say	  the	  current	  
administration	  improves	  citizen	  security?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  N12:	  To	  what	  extent	  would	  you	  say	  the	  current	  
administration	  combats	  unemployment?	  
Hypothesis	  7	  
	   On	  a	  similar	  note,	  Norris	  (2011)	  offers	  that	  studies	  indicate	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  corruption	  is	  a	  widespread	  concern	  amongst	  citizens	  of	  Latin	  America.	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Hellman	  (2008)	  and	  Auyero	  (2007)	  also	  support	  these	  conclusions.	  Thus,	  a	  seventh	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  drawn:	  
Hypothesis	  7	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  believe	  
that	  a	  high	  level	  that	  corruption	  exists	  within	  their	  government	  than	  in	  countries	  
where	  citizens	  believe	  a	  low	  level	  of	  corruption	  exists.	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  EPP2:	  To	  what	  extent	  does	  corruption	  exist	  
within	  your	  country’s	  political	  parties?	  Report	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1-­‐7.	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  EXC7:	  Taking	  into	  account	  your	  own	  
experience	  or	  what	  you	  have	  heard,	  corruption	  amongst	  public	  officials	  is:	  very	  
common,	  common,	  uncommon,	  very	  uncommon?	  
Hypothesis	  8	   	  
	   On	  another	  level,	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  citizens	  are	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  workings	  of	  democracy	  in	  their	  country,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  understand	  these	  workings	  to	  be	  based	  on	  instrumental	  or	  more	  intrinsic	  factors.	  Moreover,	  Norris	  (2011)	  presents	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  those	  more	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  way	  that	  democracy	  worked	  in	  their	  country	  were	  more	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  protest.	  Thus,	  an	  eighth	  hypothesis	  arises:	  
Hypothesis	  8	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  are	  
dissatisfied	  with	  the	  democratic	  performance	  of	  their	  governments	  than	  citizens	  in	  
countries	  where	  citizens	  are	  satisfied	  with	  the	  democratic	  performance	  if	  their	  
governments.	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• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  PN4:	  In	  general,	  would	  you	  say	  that	  you	  are	  
very	  satisfied,	  satisfied,	  dissatisfied,	  or	  very	  dissatisfied	  with	  the	  form	  of	  
democracy	  in	  your	  country?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  PN5:	  In	  your	  opinion,	  is	  your	  country	  very	  
democratic,	  somewhat	  democratic,	  not	  very	  democratic,	  not	  al	  all	  democratic?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  N3:	  To	  what	  extend	  would	  you	  say	  the	  current	  
administration	  promotes	  and	  protects	  democratic	  principles?	  
Hypothesis	  9	   	  
	   Also	  inherent	  to	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  citizens	  who	  capitalize	  on	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization	  during	  economic	  crises	  hold	  aspirations	  for	  democracy	  in	  their	  respective	  country.	  Norris	  (2011)	  furthers	  this	  idea	  when	  she	  presents	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  democratic	  aspirations	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  occurrence	  of	  protest	  activism.	  Thus,	  this	  leads	  to	  the	  ninth	  hypothesis:	  
Hypothesis	  9	  (IC):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  express	  
high	  levels	  of	  democratic	  aspirations	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  express	  low	  
levels	  of	  democratic	  aspirations.	  	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  ING4:	  Democracy	  may	  have	  problems,	  but	  it	  is	  
better	  than	  any	  other	  form	  of	  government.	  To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  agree	  or	  
disagree	  with	  this	  statement?	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• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  DEM2:	  With	  which	  one	  of	  the	  following	  
statements	  do	  you	  agree	  with	  most?	  For	  people	  like	  me	  it	  doesn’t	  matter	  
whether	  a	  regime	  is	  democratic	  or	  non-­‐democratic;	  Democracy	  is	  preferable	  
to	  any	  other	  form	  of	  government;	  Under	  some	  circumstances	  an	  authoritarian	  
government	  may	  be	  preferable	  to	  a	  democratic	  one.	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Question	  DEM11:	  Do	  you	  think	  that	  our	  country	  needs	  a	  
government	  with	  an	  iron-­‐fist,	  or	  that	  problems	  can	  be	  resolved	  with	  everyone’s	  
participation?	  
	   Norris	  explains,	  however	  that	  levels	  of	  democratic	  aspiration	  may	  be	  impacted	  by	  factors	  such	  as	  age,	  educational	  levels,	  levels	  social	  trust	  and	  associational	  activism,	  aggregate	  levels	  of	  human	  development,	  quality	  of	  governance,	  and	  type	  of	  regime	  (2011).	  Thus,	  these	  factors	  will	  be	  controlled	  for	  in	  the	  model.	  
Hypothesis	  10	  	  
	   Norris	  (2011)	  also	  provides	  evidence	  that	  demonstrates	  that	  those	  with	  democratic	  aspirations	  were	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  protest.	  These	  results	  provide	  resonance	  for	  the	  facilitating	  role	  that	  framing	  processes	  can	  play	  for	  mobilization	  during	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity.	  Thus,	  a	  tenth	  hypothesis	  emerges:	  
Hypothesis	  10	  (I):	  Citizens	  who	  express	  high	  levels	  of	  democratic	  aspiration	  are	  
more	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  protest	  than	  citizens	  who	  express	  low	  levels	  of	  democratic	  
aspirations.	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• Composite	  measurement	  of	  democratic	  aspirations	  (see	  survey	  questions	  included	  in	  Hypothesis	  9)	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  PROT1:	  Have	  you	  ever	  participated	  in	  a	  public	  
demonstration	  or	  protest?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  PROT2:	  And	  now	  thinking	  about	  the	  last	  twelve	  months,	  
have	  you	  participated	  in	  a	  demonstration	  or	  protest	  march?	  Have	  you	  done	  it	  
sometimes,	  almost	  never,	  or	  never?	  
Hypothesis	  11	  
	   As	  discussed	  above,	  citizen	  views	  and	  orientations	  only	  furnish	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  contentious	  political	  activity;	  structural	  theories	  of	  mobilization	  must	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  Walton	  and	  Ragin	  (1990)	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  occurrence	  of	  riots	  during	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century	  were	  associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  urbanization,	  thereby	  indicating	  a	  “well-­‐developed	  organizational	  infrastructure	  capable	  of	  mobilizing	  political	  action”	  (Walton	  and	  Seddon	  1994:	  45).	  Thus,	  an	  eleventh	  hypothesis	  arises:	  
Hypotheses	  11	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  
urbanization	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  urbanization.	  
• Coefficients	  calculated	  by	  regressing	  urbanization	  levels	  on	  GNP	  per	  capita	  will	  serve	  as	  an	  indicator	  of	  hyperurbanization	  (Walton	  and	  Ragin	  1990)	  
Hypothesis	  12	  	   Furthermore,	  McAdam	  et	  al	  (1996)	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  that	  mobilizing	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structures	  play	  in	  facilitating	  collective	  action.	  Thus,	  a	  twelfth	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  drawn:	  
Hypothesis	  12	  (I):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  a	  large	  number	  
of	  citizens	  are	  engaged	  in	  formal	  organizations	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  few	  citizens	  
are	  engaged	  in	  formal	  organizations.	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Questions	  CP5:	  In	  the	  last	  twelve	  months	  have	  you	  tried	  to	  
help	  solve	  a	  problem	  in	  your	  community	  or	  in	  your	  neighborhood?	  
• LAPOP	  2008	  Survey	  Questions	  CP6-­‐20:	  I	  am	  going	  to	  read	  a	  list	  of	  groups	  and	  
organizations.	  Please	  tell	  me	  if	  you	  attend	  their	  meetings	  at	  least	  once	  a	  week,	  
once	  or	  twice	  a	  month,	  once	  or	  twice	  a	  year,	  or	  never.	  
Levels	  of	  urbanization	  will	  be	  controlled	  for	  in	  this	  model.	  
Hypothesis	  13-­‐15	  	   The	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis	  warrants	  a	  consideration	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  opportunities	  during	  the	  crisis.	  The	  phenomena	  relevant	  to	  this	  consideration	  include	  the	  structures	  offered	  in	  McAdam’s	  (1996)	  typology	  above,	  namely	  the	  relative	  open	  or	  closure	  of	  the	  institutionalized	  political	  system;	  the	  stability	  or	  instability	  of	  the	  broad	  set	  of	  elite	  alignments	  that	  typically	  undergird	  a	  polity;	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  elite	  allies;	  and	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  and	  propensity	  for	  repression	  (1996:	  27).	  Proxy	  variables	  can	  be	  used	  to	  operationalize	  the	  measurement	  of	  these	  structures.	  These	  proxies	  are	  identified	  below.	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Hypothesis	  13	  
	   The	  relative	  openness	  of	  a	  system	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  Freedom	  House’s	  “Freedom	  in	  the	  World”	  assessment.	  This	  annual	  publication	  offers	  a	  global	  comparative	  evaluation	  of	  political	  rights	  and	  civil	  liberties	  based	  on	  a	  set	  of	  standardized	  scores.	  Walton	  and	  Ragin	  (1990)	  support	  that	  the	  level	  of	  formal	  civil	  and	  political	  rights	  determines	  the	  level	  of	  openness	  of	  a	  polity.	  Political	  freedoms	  proved	  a	  significant	  variable	  in	  Berezneva	  and	  Lee’s	  (2011)	  study	  as	  they	  demonstrate	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  of	  protest	  occurrence	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  crisis	  across	  African	  countries	  with	  fewer	  political	  freedoms.	  Thus,	  a	  thirteenth	  hypothesis	  can	  be	  tested:	  
Hypotheses	  13	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  have	  
low	  levels	  of	  political	  freedoms	  than	  in	  countries	  where	  citizens	  have	  high	  levels	  of	  
political	  freedoms.	  
Hypothesis	  14	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  level	  of	  external	  debt	  held	  by	  a	  country	  can	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  stability	  of	  elite	  alignments	  of	  a	  polity.	  This	  proxy	  proved	  important	  in	  Walton	  and	  Ragin’s	  (1990)	  analysis	  of	  riots	  that	  occurred	  in	  developing	  countries	  during	  the	  late	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  authors	  claim	  that	  the	  level	  of	  external	  debt	  service	  affects	  the	  fiscal	  viability	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state,	  thus	  making	  it	  more	  susceptible	  to	  “disintegration”	  and	  instability,	  and	  ultimately	  challenge	  during	  crises	  such	  as	  economic	  shocks.	  Taking	  a	  country’s	  debt	  service-­‐to-­‐exports	  ratio	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captures	  this	  variable,	  as	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  debt	  repayment	  is	  though	  exports	  (Walton	  and	  Ragin	  1990).	  
	   Additionally,	  according	  to	  some	  theoretical	  orientations	  of	  world	  systems	  theory,	  this	  proxy	  also	  helps	  to	  explain	  a	  state’s	  capacity	  for	  repression.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  debt	  are	  aggressively	  developmental,	  and	  thus	  may	  be	  more	  authoritarian.	  The	  Cingranelli-­‐Richards	  (CIRI)	  Human	  Rights	  Database	  can	  also	  be	  used	  to	  measure	  the	  capacity	  or	  propensity	  for	  state	  repression.	  The	  CIRI	  database	  affords	  an	  estimation	  of	  the	  effects	  on	  human	  rights	  that	  occur	  as	  a	  result	  of	  institutional	  and	  public	  policy	  changes.	  While	  it	  may	  seem	  counterintuitive	  that	  states	  with	  a	  greater	  capacity	  for	  repression	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  protest	  occurrence	  during	  2008,	  Walton	  and	  Ragin	  (1990)	  offer	  that	  a	  state’s	  repressive	  capacity	  is	  compromised	  during	  international	  crises	  such	  that	  heightened	  international	  awareness	  of	  regressive	  domestic	  actions	  are	  more	  costly	  during	  these	  events.	  Given	  these	  assumptions,	  hypothesis	  fourteen	  includes:	  
	  Hypothesis	  14.a.	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  
external	  debt	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  external	  debt.	  
Hypothesis	  14.b.	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  
human	  rights	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  human	  rights.	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Hypothesis	  15	  
	   Finally,	  given	  the	  historical	  presence	  and	  impact	  of	  patronage	  political	  networks	  in	  Latin	  America,	  the	  extent	  of	  elite	  allies	  can	  be	  estimated	  via	  Transparency	  International’s	  Corruption	  Perception	  Index	  and	  the	  Global	  Corruption	  Barometer.	  Through	  a	  variety	  of	  ways,	  these	  tools	  capture	  the	  level	  of	  corruption	  that	  exists	  within	  a	  country’s	  public	  and	  private	  sector,	  thus	  helping	  to	  shed	  light	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  elite	  allies.	  Thus,	  hypothesis	  fifteen	  is	  as	  follows:	  
Hypothesis	  15	  (C):	  Food	  riots	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  
political	  corruption	  than	  in	  countries	  with	  low	  levels	  of	  political	  corruption.	  
	   Overall,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  all	  fifteen	  hypotheses	  offers	  the	  opportunity	  for	  a	  systematic	  and	  comprehensive	  analysis	  that	  includes	  both	  individual	  and	  structural	  level	  factors	  to	  explain	  the	  political	  determinants	  of	  the	  food	  riots	  in	  Central	  America	  during	  the	  2008	  food	  price	  crisis.	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CONCLUSION	  
	   In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  developed	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  systematic	  investigation	  of	  the	  political	  determinants	  of	  widespread	  protest	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  2007-­‐08	  global	  food	  price	  crisis.	  Broadly	  engaging	  Acemoglu	  and	  Robinson’s	  (2001,	  2006)	  theory	  of	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  for	  mobilization	  engendered	  by	  transitory	  economic	  crises,	  I	  consider	  the	  role	  that	  both	  individual	  and	  structural	  factors	  play	  in	  promoting	  collective	  action	  for	  political	  change	  that	  occurs	  during	  such	  events.	  Fifteen	  hypotheses	  were	  offered	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  theory	  on	  food	  riots,	  political	  culture,	  and	  political	  opportunity	  structures.	  	  
	   It	  is	  my	  hope	  that	  the	  results	  of	  the	  proposed	  study	  will	  contribute	  to	  several	  fields	  of	  interest.	  First,	  it	  is	  my	  goal	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  literature	  on	  the	  democratic	  window	  of	  opportunity	  thesis,	  demonstrating	  that	  economic	  crises	  can	  engender	  the	  emergence	  of	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  for	  mobilization	  oriented	  towards	  political	  change.	  Second,	  I	  aim	  to	  shed	  new	  light	  on	  the	  study	  of	  political	  culture	  and	  its	  implications	  for	  contentious	  collective	  action,	  showing	  that	  protest	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  in	  democratic	  polities	  where	  citizen	  hopes	  for	  democracy	  are	  high,	  and	  their	  satisfaction	  with	  how	  democracy	  actually	  works	  in	  their	  country	  low.	  Finally,	  I	  intend	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  discussion	  on	  food	  insecurity	  and	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  food	  riots	  in	  developing	  countries	  where	  levels	  of	  food	  insecurity	  is	  high.	  Ultimately,	  this	  thesis	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  proposal	  for	  future	  research	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  citizen	  political	  views	  and	  changing	  political	  opportunity	  structures	  in	  facilitating	  widespread	  social	  unrest	  during	  transitory	  economic	  shocks.	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